Constitutional Law - Validity of Zoning Ordinances Discriminating against Private Educational Institutions by Kordus, Claude
Marquette Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 4 Spring 1955 Article 7
Constitutional Law - Validity of Zoning
Ordinances Discriminating against Private
Educational Institutions
Claude Kordus
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Claude Kordus, Constitutional Law - Validity of Zoning Ordinances Discriminating against Private Educational Institutions, 38 Marq. L.
Rev. 274 (1955).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol38/iss4/7
RECENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-Validity of Zoning Ordinances Discrimi-
nating against Private Educational Institutions-The plaintiff, the
Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference, owned land in a class
"A" residence zone in the city of Wauwatosa, Wisconsin. When
the Conference applied for a building permit to construct a private
high school with adjacent athletic grounds, Sinar, the building
inspector, refused permission. Sinar refused on the grounds that
the zoning ordinance for the class "A" area specifically prohibited
the building of private secondary schools. Objecting to the fact
that the ordinance permitted construction of a public secondary
school, the plaintiff brought an action in mandamus to compel
Sinar to issue the permit. Held: No unconstitutional or otherwise
illegal discrimination appears in the ordinance by reason of its exclu-
sion of private high schools from "A" zones, while allowing public
schools of the same rank. There is a material distinction between
public and private schools in that the public schools serve the entire
area without discrimination. Justice Steinle in his dissent, which was
concurred in by Justice Broadfoot, maintains that there is no sub-
stantial distinction between public and private high schools in the
same area because both would serve the same purpose of educating
the children of the community and vicinity. State ex rel. Wisconsin
Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar et al., 267 Wis. 91, 65
N. W. 2d 43 (1954).
The governmental power to zone, like all police powers, is limited
by provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States has
ruled that "such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare."1 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel Ford Hopkins
v. Mayor- stated:
"This court has applied the following general rules upon which
classification may be based in the exercise of police power:
(1) All classification must be based upon substantial
distinctions which make one class really different from
from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the
purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must be based upon existing condi-
tions only.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 Sup. Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842
(1928).
2 State ex rel. Ford Hopkins Co. v. Mayor, 226 Wis. 215, 276 N.W., 311 (1937).
See also 8 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3rd ed., §25.61, and 12 Am.JuL., Constitutional Law §481, p. 153.
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(4) To whatever class a law may apply it must apply to
each member thereof."
The majority opinion in the instant case admits that the courts
of other states, in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery and City
of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear,4 on practically identical fact
situations, have held this type of classification violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The
Wisconsin Court, however, finds a material difference between public
and private schools because the private school does not make the
same contribution to the public welfare. justice Brown writing the
majority opinion states:
"But when we come to the 'promotion of the general welfare
of the community' * * * 'Ay, there's the rub.' The public school
has the same features objectionable to the surrounding area as
a private one, but it has also a virtue which the other lacks,
namely, that it is located to serve and does serve that area with-
out discrimination. Whether the private school is sectarian or
commercial, though it now complains of discrimination, in its
services it discriminates and the public school does not. Anyone
in the district of fit age and educational qualifications may
attend the public high school. It is his right. He has no com-
parable right to attend a private school. To go there he must
meet additional standards over which the public neither has nor
should have control. The private school imposes on the com-
munity all the disadvantages of the public school, but does not
compensate the community in the same manner or to the same
extent. If the private school does not make the same contribu-
tion to the public welfare this difference may be taken into
consideration by the legislative body in forming its ordinance."
In support of its decision the court cites four decisions: McCarter
v. Beckwith,5 Golf, Inc. v. District of Columbia,6 Cincinnati v. Wege-
hoft,7 and State ex rel. Carter v. Harper.8 The court contends that
they are analogous. The Beckwith case9 upheld a distinction made
between a private and public park. A distinction made between a
private and public driving range was upheld in the Golf, Inc. case.10
The Wegehoft case' upheld an ordinance which allowed a fire station
in a zone where no other non-residence structures were allowed. The
Harper case1 2 gave approval to a distinction made between a private
3 Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E2d 583 (1939).
4 City of Miami Beach v. State ex rt. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So.537 (1937).
5 McCarter v. Beckwith, 247 App. Div. 289, 285 N.Y.S. 151 (1936).
6 Golf, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 67 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
7City of Cincinnati v. Wegehoft, 119 Ohio 136, 162 N.W. 389 (1928).
8 State ex. rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923).9 Supra, note 5.
10 Supra, note 6.
11 Supra, note 7.
12 Supra, note 8.
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transportation corporation and a wholesale and retail milk dairy
business because of the public interest involved in the transportation
corporation.
Judge Steinle, in the dissenting opinion, contends that the only
difference between public and private schools is that one is organized
and maintained as one of the institutions of the state, whereas the
other is maintained by private individuals, and that this is not a
substantial enough distinction to support the restriction. The Catholic
Bishop of Chicago case' 3 and Miami Beach case' 4 are cited in support
of this position and also Phillips v City of Homewood,15 Lumpkin v.
Township Committee of Bermonds,16 State v. Northwestern Prepara-
tory SchooP and Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc."8
This writer believes that the Catholic Bishop of Chicago case' 9 and
the City of Miami Beach case, 20 which the majority admits are
identical in fact to the present situation, but which it rejects, appear
more persuasive than the Wisconsin attitude. In the Catholic Bishop
of Chicago case2 1 the court states:
"We fail to perceive to what degree a Catholic school of this
type will be more detrimental or dangerous to the public health
than a public school. It is not pointed out to us just how the
pupils in attendance at the parochial school are any more likely
to jeopardize the public safety than the public school pupils.
Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the prospective students
of the new school will seriously undermine the general welfare.
As a matter of fact such a school, conducted in accordance with
the educational authorities is promotive of the general welfare.
The court in the City of Miami Beach case2 2 also held that there
was no substantial relation between this type of classification and the
public safety, health, morals, comfort, or general welfare.
Phillips v. City of Homewood, 23 decided in 1951, comes to the
same conclusion on facts practically identical with the instant case.
In this case a comprehensive zoning ordinance which had allowed
both public and private schools in a particular zone was amended to
include only public schools. The court in rejecting this type of
23Supra, note 3.
24Supra, note 4.
'5 Phillips v. City of Homewood, 255 Ala. 180, 50 So.2d 267 (1951).
26 Lumpkin v. Township Committee of Bermonds, 134 N.J.L. 428, 48 A.2d 798(1946).
1 State v. Northwestern Preparatory School, 228 Minn. 363, 37 N.W.2d 370(1949).
Is Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., 11 N.J. 341, 94 A.2d 482 (1953).
'
9 Supra, note 3.
2Supra, note 4.
21Supra, note 3.
22Supra, note 4.
23 Supra, note 15.
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restriction points out significantly that "no case or authority to the
contrary has been cited to us and we found none." 24
There are still other analogous decisions which involved zoning
ordinances that allowed public and church supported schools in a
particular zone but not other private schools.25 Such ordinances were
not upheld. The Northwestern Preparatory case supports the view
that "so far as purposes of the ordinance are concerned there is no
difference between public and parochial schools on one hand and
private schools on the other.128
The term "discrimination" used in the majority opinion in the
instant case to describe the admission policies of private schools is not
only vague but misapplied. If the court meant by discrimination some-
thing contrary to the public welfare it should have explained in detail
what it considered to be violative of the public welfare in the admission
policy of private schools. It would seem, on its face, that for those
students whom it does educate, the private school serves the general
welfare in the same manner as the public school does for the students
it educates. Indeed it has been held "that the end of both private
and public schools must be the same-education of children of school
age."2T
It should also be noted that the cases cited by the majority are
really not in point at all. While these cases were logically decided
they cannot be construed to prove that there is a distinction between
public and private schools significant enough to support the unequal
treatment in the zoning law question. In the Beckwith,2s Golf, Inc. 29
and Harper cases, 30 the ordinances did not allow a private park, private
driving range, or a privately owned wholesale and retail milk business.
It cannot be said that these private interests which were barred were
in any sense on an equal footing with a private school as to their
contribution to the public welfare. In the Wegehoft case,31 the reason
why a fire station was allowed in a residential zone is transparently
clear.
The grave danger in the philosophy of the principal case is that
it can be used by communities to zone out private schools completely
from all residential areas. They could then be built and maintained in
only the business and industrial areas, or outside city limits. If it is
not arbitrary to make a distinction between a public and private school
in a class "A" zone there seems to be no reason why it cannot be
24 Ibid.25 Supra, notes 16, 17, 18.
26 Ibid.
27 State v. Counort, 69 Wash. 361, 124 P. 910, 41 L.R.A. 957 (1912).
- Supra, note 5.29 Supra, note 6.
30 Supra, note 7.
a Supra, note 8.
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